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HEMISPHERES APART,
A PROFESSION CONNECTED
Dana Remus*
INTRODUCTION
Social scientists have long recognized the bifurcated and stratified nature
of the American legal profession.1 They describe a two-tiered profession:
in the corporate hemisphere, high-status graduates of elite law schools
overwhelmingly work in large law firms serving corporate clients;2 in the
personal-services hemisphere, graduates of less prestigious, local law
schools work in smaller firms and serve individual clients.3 In the past
twenty years, legal scholars have built on this model in valuable ways.
They have studied the distinct ethical challenges of lawyering in each
hemisphere and offered normative proposals to address those challenges.4
In drawing the two hemispheres apart, however, these scholars have
overlooked the many links that tie them together.
Initially, scholars proposed heightened client and public protections in
particular contexts.5 Today, many scholars propose to relax professional
regulation in just one hemisphere. Some advocate a relaxation of
unauthorized practice rules in the personal-services hemisphere to increase
competition, decrease prices, and make legal services more accessible to all
segments of the population.6 Others propose a relaxation of particular
client protections in the corporate hemisphere to honor client autonomy and
choice.7
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. For insightful
comments on prior drafts, I am grateful to Al Brophy, Bernie Burke, Elizabeth Chambliss,
Bill Marshall, Mary Mitchell, Richard Myers, and Brad Wendel. For excellent research
assistance, I am grateful to Erin Locker and Troy Shelton.
1. In their 1975 study of Chicago lawyers, sociologists Jon Heinz and Edward
Laumann theorized that most of the differentiation they observed within the legal profession
turned on one fundamental distinction—the type of client. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O.
LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982). They therefore
theorized that the legal profession consisted of two distinct hemispheres: one serving
corporate clients and one serving individuals. Id. at 127–75. Subsequently, social scientists
(including Heinz and Laumann themselves) built upon this framework in many important
ways, documenting the growing distance between the two hemispheres, and studied the
different norms, cultures, and practices of lawyers working in each. See infra notes 15–26
and accompanying text.
2. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 1, at 192–93.
3. Id. at 193.
4. See infra notes 30–34 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 30–34 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
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In this Article, I explore the unintended consequences of these proposals.
I argue that although scholars advocating the two sets of changes have
distinct goals and motivations, their proposals suffer from a common
flaw—they fail to account for the extent and significance of links that
connect the profession’s two hemispheres. These links are forged through
lawyers’ common training and socialization, and common responsibility for
the fairness and integrity of our legal system. They are also forged in a less
recognized way—through countless daily interactions, ranging from basic
consumer contracts to full-blown legal disputes, between clients of the two
hemispheres. Drawing on these interactions, I argue that proposals to relax
regulation along the profession’s existing structural contours threaten to
exaggerate and entrench wealth and power disparities in the profession and
in society at large.
In Part I, I review both the social science literature that documents the
profession’s bifurcated structure and the legal scholarship that incorporates
that bifurcated structure into proposals for context-specific regulation. I
focus on recent proposals to loosen client protections in each hemisphere.
In Part II, I argue that relaxing ethical standards in either hemisphere would
have troubling system-wide ramifications.
In the personal-services
hemisphere, it would threaten to depress the quality of available legal
services and to place individual clients at an even greater disadvantage visà-vis repeat-player corporate clients. In the corporate hemisphere, it would
undermine professional independence and could allow corporate clients to
use their lawyers to achieve aggressive and unethical ends. In both cases,
relaxing ethical standards would threaten to exacerbate existing structural
inequalities.
I conclude in Part III by suggesting that legal ethics scholars have an
obligation to acknowledge and address the inequities that inhere in many
interactions between the clients of the profession’s two hemispheres.
Rather than drawing these hemispheres apart, scholars should be accounting
for their interconnectedness. We should do so by thinking creatively about
a broader range of regulatory reforms than are currently under
consideration—reforms that can expand the provision of competent legal
services to a broader range of clients while strengthening the profession’s
independence from corporate clients.
I. THE STRATIFICATION OF THE PROFESSION
The structural division of lawyers into two distinct hemispheres is now
widely accepted by scholars of the legal profession. But when John Heinz
and Edward Laumann published Chicago Lawyers in 1982, the hemispheres
theory was groundbreaking. I begin this Part by reviewing their initial
study, their follow-up study twenty years later, and subsequent social
science work building on their framework. I then turn to the normative and
prescriptive work of legal scholars who propose a loosening of professional
regulation to address salient problems in each of the profession’s
hemispheres. These include the need for increased access to quality
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lawyering in the personal-services hemisphere and increased professional
independence in the corporate hemisphere.
A. Social Science Literature
In 1975, Heinz and Laumann conducted face-to-face interviews with a
random sample of 777 Chicago attorneys, who spanned a variety of practice
areas and career stages.8 Based on their findings, they concluded that most
of the differentiation within the legal profession—between lawyers’
backgrounds, training, incomes, and work life—turned on one fundamental
distinction—the type of client being served.9 They observed that most
lawyers serving corporations and other large organizations were members
of high-status families and graduates of elite law schools, who worked in
large, high-status firms.10 Lawyers who primarily served individuals, in
contrast, tended to come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and to be
graduates of local law schools.11 Overwhelmingly, they worked as solo
practitioners or in small law firms. Many were racial or ethnic minorities.12
Heinz and Laumann theorized that based on the different client bases, the
late twentieth-century profession was stratified into a corporate hemisphere
and a distinct personal-services hemisphere.13 Observing that practice in
the corporate as opposed to personal-services hemisphere dictated higher
salaries, greater prestige, and increased job security, they concluded that the
profession’s bifurcated structure reinforced the class distinctions it
reflected.14
In the decades following the 1970s, the profession’s hemispheres grew
farther apart while fragmenting within. When Heinz, Laumann, and two
new collaborators updated their study in the late 1990s,15 they concluded
that, notwithstanding significant changes in the market for legal services
(including declining racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination),16 the divide
between the two classes of clients had endured.17 They observed that the
lawyers serving each type of client continued to come from significantly
different backgrounds and that socioeconomic status continued to be the
8. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 1, at 10–13.
9. Id. at 320 (“Though there certainly are distinctions among lawyers that cut across the
line between the two broad classes of clients, this fundamental difference in the nature of the
client served appears to be the principal factor that structures the social differentiation of the
profession.”).
10. Id. at 187–93.
11. Id. at 133–34, 193.
12. Id. at 127, 158–59.
13. Id. at 319.
14. Id. at 196–97, 373–79.
15. JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
(2005).
16. Among other things, they observed that women and minorities were better
represented in the profession, id. at 20–23, and that ethnoreligious background had fallen
away as a determinant of law school and career path, id. at 60–62. But the new groups
entering the profession were largely excluded from the large-law corporate law firms of the
corporate hemisphere. Id. at 72–73.
17. Id. at 7.
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critical differentiator.18 Even more so than before, lawyers serving
corporate entities were rewarded with significantly higher levels of income,
wealth, and prestige than lawyers serving individuals. Observing that the
lawyers of the corporate hemisphere took home a disproportionately high
percentage of lawyers’ overall earnings, Heinz and his co-collaborators
concluded that the term “hemispheres,” suggesting equal sizes, had become
somewhat misleading.19
They also observed that legal practice had become more specialized
within each hemisphere, and particularly within the corporate hemisphere.20
Whereas many lawyers had once been generalists, providing full-service
practices, Heinz and his collaborators observed an increasing number of
corporate lawyers who chose a specific practice area early in their careers.
This, in turn, pushed the two hemispheres ever further apart. It led many
large firms to “shed the smaller clients and full service practices that
previously allowed them to dabble in work that more closely resembled the
work done by their brethren in the personal plight hemisphere of the bar.”21
Large firms sought to perform only “premium work for premium clients,”22
bringing in greater revenues and further increasing the income and wealth
inequities between hemispheres.
In recent years, sociologists of the legal profession have built on Heinz
and Laumann’s work in a number of ways. Some have studied the cultures,
pressures, and practices of particular practice areas within each
hemisphere.23 Others have continued to study profession-wide trends using

18. They found that socioeconomic status, as measured by father’s occupation, remained
a reliable predictor of law school attended, and law school attended remained the critical
gatekeeper to the more lucrative world of corporate practice. See id. at 58 tbl.3.1; see also id.
at 66–67 (“Given the correlation between father’s occupation and type of law school
attended, and the further relationship between law school and practice context, income, and
the likelihood of partnership, we should expect there to be a strong relationship between
social background and the hierarchy of career opportunities in the legal profession.”);
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Staying Power: The Persistence of Social Inequality in Shaping
Lawyer Stratification and Lawyers’ Persistence in the Profession, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 539,
543 (2007) (“While the profession opened up to women and racial minorities, it did not see
an increasing representation of the children of the non-professional classes. Lawyers whose
fathers had worked in professional or technical occupations composed 32% of the practicing
Chicago bar in 1975 and 57% in 1995.”).
19. John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers’ Work: Chicago in 1975
and 1995, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 751, 766–67 (1998).
20. Id. at 37.
21. David Wilkins, Some Realism about Legal Realism for Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN
PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 29–30 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather
eds., 2012).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); LYNN MATHER, CRAIG A. MCEWEN &
RICHARD J. MAIMAN, DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN
PRACTICE (2001); MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL
STREET LAWYER (2004); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It Has Had Is
Between People’s Ears”: Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 453 (2000); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Fracturing Legal Profession: The Case of
Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Lawyers, 8 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 225 (2001).
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data from the American Bar Foundation’s After the JD study.24
Overwhelmingly, they have concluded that while overt discrimination
based on gender, race, and religion has significantly decreased within the
legal profession,25 socioeconomic status continues to play a determinative
role in many lawyers’ career paths.26 Accordingly, the stratified structure
of the legal profession continues to mirror the stratification of society at
large.
B. Legal Literature
Like their colleagues in social science departments, legal scholars
studying the profession have long appreciated and built upon Heinz and
Laumann’s work. In a series of seminal articles in the early 1990s, David
Wilkins critiqued the profession’s singular and unified regulatory model for
failing to address the existence of, and differentiation between, the
profession’s hemispheres.27 Citing the varied realities of legal practice
described by Heinz, Laumann, and others, he advocated a system of
“middle-level rules” to address the different work and ethical challenges of
different lawyering contexts.28 Many legal ethicists agreed. Following
24. RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF
LEGAL CAREERS (2004). The After the JD study (AJD), a national longitudinal survey of law
graduates administered by the American Bar Foundation, is based on a representative sample
of 4,000 lawyers who graduated from law school between June 1998 and July 2000 and were
admitted to the bar in 2000. Id. at 14. While the survey focused on participants’ early career
trajectories, it also asked questions about participants’ families, background, and education,
including questions about the education of both parents. Id. at 17–20.
25. See, e.g., Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L.
REV. 631, 633 (2011).
26. The first wave of AJD data showed that very few individuals from poor and
disadvantaged backgrounds were attending law school at all. Joyce Sterling et al., The
Changing Social Role of Urban Law Schools, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 389, 405 (2007). The
overwhelming majority of law students, and particularly students at the most prestigious
schools, came from relatively privileged backgrounds. Sander, supra note 25, at 632 (“The
vast majority of American law students come from relatively elite backgrounds; this is
especially true at the most prestigious law schools, where only five percent of all students
come from families whose [socioeconomic score] is in the bottom half of the national
distribution.”). The AJD data also established a correlation between father’s educational
attainment and law school attended, see Sterling et al., supra, at 404, and between law school
attended and the subsequent practice setting in which a lawyer worked. While a majority of
elite law school graduates went into practice in large corporate firms, only 15 percent of
graduates of nonelite schools worked in firms of over 100 lawyers. Id. at 406. A substantial
portion of those graduates worked in solo or small-firm practice. Id. at 405. Independent of
law school attended, Sterling and her colleagues also established a correlation between
socioeconomic status and practice setting. Id. at 409. Rebecca Sandefur, one of the authors
on the updated Chicago study, drew similar conclusions from the AJD data. Sandefur, supra
note 18, at 547.
27. See generally David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468
(1990) [hereinafter Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers]; David B. Wilkins, Making Context
Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993)
[hereinafter Wilkins, Making Context Count]; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992) [hereinafter Wilkins, Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?].
28. Wilkins referred to these rules as “middle-level rules” to clarify that he was not
advocating a contextual approach taken to an extreme—with each case taken entirely on its
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Wilkins’ lead, they proposed rules and enforcement mechanisms tailored to
particular practice areas and client types.29
Today, scholars of the legal profession are proposing to account for the
profession’s two-tiered structure in a new way. Two groups of scholars—
albeit with very different goals and motivations—are proposing to address
the growing stratification of the legal profession through efforts to loosen,
rather than tighten, regulation.
The first group is focused on problems of unmet legal needs in the
professional-services hemisphere.30 Reasoning that some legal services are
better than none, and that many of the needed services are simple and
routine, these scholars propose relaxation of the unauthorized practice of
law rules.31 Early proponents argued for the lay provision of legal
services.32 Today, most proponents support a limited licensing scheme.
Much like a program recently adopted in the state of Washington,33
own facts and circumstances. Instead, he was proposing a “a set of ‘middle-level’ principles
that both isolate and respond to relevant differences in social and institutional context while
providing a structural foundation for widespread compliance in the areas where they apply.”
Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, supra note 27, at 516.
29. See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes To
Include the Non-adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923 (1996);
Bernard P. Ingold, An Overview and Analysis of the New Rules of Professional Conduct for
Army Lawyers, 124 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1989); David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to
Clients and Duties to Others—The Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the
Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169 (2009); Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers’
Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the
Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 513 (2005); Nancy B. Rapoport,
Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 45 (1998); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional
Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993); see also Acad. of
Fam. Mediators, Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, in CODES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 3d ed. 1994); Am. Arb. Ass’n, The
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra.
30. See, e.g., Quintin Johnstone, An Overview of the Legal Profession in the United
States, How That Profession Recently Has Been Changing, and Its Future Prospects, 26
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 770–71 (2008); Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting
Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 371–72 (2004).
31. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic
Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 457
(2001); Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really
Make Good Neighbors—or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 209–12;
Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 531, 615 (1994); George C. Leef, Lawyer Fees Too High? The Case for Repealing
Unauthorized Practice of Law Statutes, REGULATION, Winter 1997, at 33; Rhode, supra note
30, at 410; Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to
Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 709–13 (1996); Christina L.
Underwood, Balancing Consumer Interest in a Digital Age: A New Approach to Regulating
the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 437, 442 (2004).
32. See, e,g., Deborah Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 38
(1981).
33. In June 2012, the State of Washington, through its supreme court, approved and
adopted regulations for “Limited License Legal Technicians.” Order at 1, In re Adoption of
New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal Technicians, No. 25700-A1005 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/
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individuals with some training but not a full law degree would be able to
register with the state to perform specified, routine tasks.34 Proponents
contend that either change would increase competition, decrease prices, and
make legal services more accessible to all segments of the population.
Noting an absence of empirical evidence that lay providers or limited
license providers would harm either individual consumers or the public at
large, they argue that the downsides would be minimal.35
The second group of scholars focuses on the corporate hemisphere.
Observing that most corporate clients are sophisticated consumers of legal
services who do not suffer from significant information asymmetries, these
scholars argue that corporate clients should be afforded greater autonomy,
flexibility, and choice than the profession’s codes of conduct permit.36
They therefore propose that sophisticated corporate clients be permitted to
contract around the protections of the ethical codes. They bolster their
argument by noting that, as compared to individual clients, corporate clients
are less likely to suffer irreversible harm as a result of incompetent
lawyering and more likely to be compensated adequately by money
damages in malpractice suits.37 Their proposals are not without precedent.
Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf. The Washington technicians are permitted, among
several other things, to investigate factual issues and explain their relevance to clients,
inform clients about legal procedures and deadlines, and review documents received by
clients from opposing counsel and explain their impact. See id. at 15–16. But the technicians
may neither represent clients in proceedings nor negotiate on their behalf. See id. at 18–19.
Washington is the only state to have adopted this type of scheme, but other states are also
actively exploring this option. See Wallace B. Jefferson, Liberty and Justice for Some: How
the Legal System Falls Short in Protecting Basic Rights, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1953, 1976–77
(2013).
34. See Rhode, supra note 30, at 409; see also David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted:
Using Market and Liability Forces To Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practice
for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203, 260–61 (2004); Laurel A. Rigertas, Stratification of
the Legal Profession: A Debate in Need of a Public Forum, 2012 J. PROF. LAW. 79;
Meredith Ann Munro, Note, Deregulation of the Practice of Law: Panacea or Placebo?, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 203, 241 (1990).
35. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The Future Role of “Law Workers”: Rethinking the
Forms of Legal Practice and the Scope of Legal Education, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 921
(2002); Rhode, supra note 32, at 38; Rhode, supra note 31, at 709–10; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c (2000) (noting that in
the few states that have allowed extensive nonlawyer provision of legal services, there has
been no indication of any significant risks to consumers).
36. See, e.g., Audrey I. Benison, The Sophisticated Client: A Proposal for the
Reconciliation of Conflicts of Interest Standards for Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 699, 733–34 (2000); John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni,
Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to
Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
83, 90 (2000); Sarah J. Lewis, Charting the “Middle” Way: Liberalizing Multijurisdictional
Practice Rules for Lawyers Representing Sophisticated Clients, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
631, 636 (2009); see also David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the
Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2079 n.47 (2010); cf.
Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1730–32
(2008).
37. See Lewis, supra note 36, at 655; Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra
note 27, at 831–32.
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In recent years, the profession’s conflicts rules have been tailored to the
interests of sophisticated clients, permitting advance waivers where, among
other things, “the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved
and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise.”38
These scholars’ context-specific approaches to regulation are based on
the critical insight that lawyers in different practice areas with different
clients face significantly different pressures and ethical tensions.
Meaningful and effective regulation must acknowledge and account for the
variation. But there is a danger that, in focusing on what draws lawyers and
their clients apart, it is easy to lose sight of the extent to which they are
inextricably bound together. All contextual approaches to regulation risk
losing sight of these connections, but as discussed next, proposals to loosen
regulation along the profession’s existing structural contours entail unique
and particularly worrisome risks.
II. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN HEMISPHERES
The lawyers and clients of the profession’s two hemispheres may live
and work in different worlds, but they interact regularly. In this Part, I
argue that these interactions constitute a principal way in which the
profession’s bifurcated structure reinforces inequities in society at large. I
also argue that existing mechanisms of professional regulation play an
important role in countering these inequities and balancing the playing
field. Given this, proposals to relax professional regulation in either
hemisphere threaten to reinforce and entrench existing inequities in the
profession and in society at large.
A. Client Interactions
The clients of the profession’s hemispheres interact with each other in
myriad ways. Individuals rely on corporations for the products and services
that sustain daily life (e.g., food, shelter, transportation, and medicine) as
well as for a host of additional products and services that improve the
convenience and quality of life (e.g., computers, insurance, credit cards, and
banking services).39 Corporations, for their part, actively market these
products and services to all segments of society.
The resulting interactions have countless legal implications, often leading
to full-blown legal disputes. Indeed, a majority of all court cases in the
United States involve individual litigants on one side and corporate or
organizational litigants on the other.40 Some are initiated by corporate
38. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (2013).
39. Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its Users, 53
BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (2006).
40. In a study of federal court litigation, Gillian Hadfield concluded that in the year
2000, a significant majority of federal cases were between individuals on one side and
corporate entities on the other. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic
Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in
the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1298 (2005). Data does not
exist for comprehensive conclusions regarding state courts, but a 1992 study concluded that
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clients, who pursue individuals for matters such as debt collection or
foreclosure; others are initiated by individuals, who pursue corporate clients
to hold them liable for harm.
For a number of reasons, these cases are frequently resolved on an
unbalanced playing field. The parties themselves bring different resources
to bear, with those of the corporate litigants generally outstripping those of
the individuals. Reinforcing this imbalance, the lawyers bring to bear the
advantages and disadvantages of their respective hemispheres.41 Although
excellent and experienced lawyers practice in both hemispheres (as do
lesser quality and inexperienced lawyers), those practicing in the corporate
hemisphere are often backed by greater power, wealth, and status than those
of the personal-services hemisphere.42
In at least three ways, this imbalance reinforces the social disparities that
the profession’s structure reflects. First, it leads to higher success rates for
corporate clients in court. Empirical studies of federal court litigation
reveal that corporate litigants win more frequently and lose less frequently
than individuals.43 Second, it empowers corporate clients to exert greater
influence on the judicial agenda than individual clients. As Marc Galanter
describes, corporate and organizational clients “make[] courts more futureoriented, more managerial, more utilitarian, and generally more
‘legislative.’”44 This forward-looking, regulatory view, in turn, confers
significant advantages on the repeat players of the corporate hemisphere,
who can invest and plan accordingly. Corporate litigants may also draw
judicial attention away from smaller disputes between individuals. Galanter
explains, “Mirroring the prestige structure of the bar, many judges think
in the seventy-five most populous counties in the country, 60 percent of civil jury trials
involved an individual plaintiff suing an organizational defendant. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: JURY CASES AND
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 3 tbl.4 (1995).
41. It will not be in every matter that the lawyers on both sides of a case—even a case
involving an individual on one side and an organization on the other—will come from
different hemispheres. In many instances, such as run-of-the-mill landlord-tenant cases, both
parties will be represented by the solo practitioners and smaller firms of the personalservices hemisphere even if the landlord is formally organized as a corporate entity. In a
significant number of cases involving an individual litigant on one side and a corporate
litigant on the other, however, the opposing lawyers will, in fact, come from the two
different hemispheres.
42. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 998 (2000) (“[T]he market for lawyers . . .
overwhelmingly allocates legal resources to clients with interests backed by corporate
aggregations of wealth.”).
43. Galanter, supra note 39, at 1389–90 (citing Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers,
Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971–1991, 21 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 497, 557 (1996)); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do
Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal
Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 605 tbl.5 (1998); Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S.
Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON.
S92, S103 tbl.2 (1997); Hadfield, supra note 40. That a vast majority of cases settle out of
court does not diminish the significance of these in-court win/loss rates, as cases settle in the
shadow of litigation.
44. Galanter, supra note 39, at 1400–01.

2674

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

that big dollar commercial cases are what properly deserve the attention of
courts and the routine matters of individuals are ‘junk cases’ that should be
addressed elsewhere.”45
Third and relatedly, the imbalanced playing field affords corporate
parties enhanced power to shape the substantive law. Backed by the
lawyers and resources of the corporate hemisphere, corporate clients can
engage in legislative and litigation-reform campaigns, often with success.
Examples include efforts to limit the availability of punitive damages46 and
to exclude certain classes of individual claims from court, subjecting them
to binding arbitration instead.47
In the aggregate, interactions between the clients of the two hemispheres
match lawyers of greater resources, power, and prestige (representing
corporate clients) against lawyers of lesser resources, power, and prestige
(representing individual clients). More often than not, the corporate clients
emerge victorious, ensuring in yet another way that the profession’s
bifurcated structure reinforces the social stratification it reflects.48
B. Loosening Professional Regulation
As just described, structural imbalances between the profession’s
hemispheres have troubling implications for the equity of our legal system.
The situation would be far worse, however, without the protections of
professional regulation—if, for example, we loosened or eliminated them
pursuant to many scholars’ proposals.
1. Relaxing Regulation in the Personal-Services Hemisphere
The foundational purpose of professional licensure is to ensure the
quality and competency of professional services. The legal profession
pursues these goals in a number of ways—by requiring law school training,
bar passage, and continuing legal education; and by conditioning conduct
through character and fitness requirements and ethical codes backed by the
threat of license revocation.49 The profession’s system of licensure and
regulation is not nearly as effective as we would like it to be, but it does
45. Id. at 1405.
46. See, e.g., id. at 1398 (citing STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND
THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995)); Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’
Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1368 (2005) (“Tort reform in the states is a victory of
the ‘haves’ over the ‘have-nots’ achieved through a disinformation campaign whose
watchword is tort reform.”); see also Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the
“Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 941, 941–42 (1999).
47. See Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR As Idealistic Movement
to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 972, 930, 932 (2002).
48. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
49. See Joseph R. Julin, The Legal Profession: Education and Entry, in REGULATING
THE PROFESSIONS, A PUBLIC-POLICY SYMPOSIUM 201, 204 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin
eds., 1980); Alan D. Wolfson et al., Regulating the Profession: A Theoretical Framework,
in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION 180, 190–200 (Simon Rothenberg ed.,
1980).
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ensure baseline levels of knowledge, training, and competence among all
lawyers.50
If licensure were eliminated as a requirement for providing legal services,
it is not likely that the quality or cost of legal services would change
significantly at the top of the market.51 Wealthy clients will always be
willing and able to pay a premium for the best legal services available.
Even if entry barriers were relaxed, therefore, it is not likely that new
entrants would compete with or displace established large-firm lawyers.52
It is similarly unlikely that competition from lower quality service providers
would exert greater downward pressure on fees than already exists from
significant competition for clients among large firms.
In the personal-services hemisphere, however, the entry of new low-cost
legal services would entail different ramifications. While it may or may not
decrease cost for clients,53 it would certainly decrease quality and
competency. Already, the risk of harm from incompetent legal services is
more significant in the personal-services hemisphere because of significant
information asymmetries. In stark contrast to sophisticated corporate
clients (who are well equipped to make informed decisions about the use
and selection of legal services), individuals and small businesses frequently
lack the knowledge, resources, and connections to evaluate lawyers’ skills
and qualifications.54 There is a distinct risk, therefore, that if licensure were
eliminated, clients and potential clients of the personal-services hemisphere
would choose service providers based on cost alone, creating a race to the
bottom.55
Many clients of the personal-services hemisphere are also ill equipped to
monitor their lawyers’ work and, where appropriate, to hold their lawyers
accountable for harm. Many lack the expertise to discern whether a mistake
is actionable and the resources to pursue a malpractice claim.56
On top of that, the extent of harm suffered by individuals who receive
incompetent legal services tends to far outweigh that suffered by corporate
clients. Unlike large and sophisticated corporate entities, individuals and

50. Barton, supra note 31, at 430.
51. Benjamin H. Barton, Economists on Deregulation of the American Legal Profession:
Praise and Critique, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 493, 509–10.
52. Id. at 510.
53. But see Munro, supra note 34, at 229 (questioning whether deregulation will cause
prices to fall, even at the low end of the market).
54. Elizabeth Michelman, Guiding the Invisible Hand: The Consumer Protection
Function of Unauthorized Practice Regulation, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 21–22 & n.75 (1984); cf.
Barton, supra note 31, at 440 (conceding information asymmetries are a major problem for
such clients, but contending economic justifications nevertheless do not support entry
barriers).
55. Rhode, supra note 31, at 710; see also Cramton, supra note 31, at 545–46
(“[P]roducers will not be compensated for the higher cost of high-quality service . . .
result[ing] in a ‘market for lemon’ because producers are forced to make price and quality
reductions that lead to the sale of only cheap products or low-quality service and the market
shrinking.”).
56. Rhode, supra note 31, at 710; see also Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?,
supra note 27, at 829, 831.
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small businesses cannot afford to treat judgments against them as mere
“speeding tickets.”57 A criminal defendant may forfeit her freedom because
of bad lawyering.58 A private client or small business may face financial
ruin as a result of bad counseling, poor transactional work, or inadequate
representation in litigation.59 A deserving plaintiff may be unable to
receive a just and full remedy for her injuries because of poor or unethical
lawyering.
Proponents of deregulation contend that these risks and harms will not
worsen if lay providers are permitted to provide legal services.60 They
emphasize that many legal transactions are routine, discrete, and easy to
perform competently, and they claim that some legal services are better than
none.61 But it is often impossible to know in advance whether a
bankruptcy, divorce, or other legal interaction will be simple and
straightforward, or whether it will implicate hidden and complicated legal
issues. Lay providers, who lack training in the analytical skills of
lawyering, are far less likely to spot and manage these issues and to
minimize the accompanying risks.62
Even if professional licensure at the bottom of the market is replaced by a
limited licensing scheme (rather than entirely eliminated), these problems
will persist. By ensuring some training and offering recourse for harmed
consumers, a limited licensing scheme could address many of the more
extreme problems of incompetent and unethical providers posed by
But it would institutionalize a two-class
complete deregulation.63
profession, in which higher-quality and better-educated lawyers are
available to the wealthier segments of society, while lower-quality legal
technicians serve the poorer segments. Like proposals to deregulate,
limited licensing schemes would therefore create greater imbalance in
interactions between the clients of the profession’s two hemispheres.

57. Cf. George M. Cohen, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law:
The View from the Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1119 n.6 (1985) (explaining the
“tradeoff” analysis completed by a motorist when weighing his ability to pay for a speeding
ticket against how much he chooses to speed).
58. See Cramton, supra note 31, at 554–55; see also Barton, supra note 31, at 440
(“[S]ome potential harms, notably those involved in criminal defense work, are potentially
irremediable and may justify regulation.”).
59. BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 48 (1970)
(“[T]he resolution of such questions may be far more important to the poor person or the
person of moderate means than the actual economic value of the case.”); cf. Andrew F.
Moore, Fraud, the Unauthorized Practice of Law and Unmet Legal Needs: A Look at State
Laws Regulating Immigration Assistants, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 5–8 (2004).
60. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 31, at 708–09.
61. See, e.g., Mary Helen McNeal, Having One Oar or Being Without a Boat:
Reflections on the Fordham Recommendations on Limited Legal Assistance, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2617, 2618 (1999).
62. Cf. Kritzer, supra note 35, at 927 (explaining that the distinction between his new
categories of legal service providers turns on the need for creativity in thinking about the
law—“thus, the distinction between the legal processor and the legal consultant might be
summed up by whether or not their cases call for what is sometimes labeled ‘creative
lawyering’”).
63. See Rhode, supra note 30, at 409.
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Represented by the highest quality lawyers and facing individuals with
lawyers or lay providers of declining quality, corporate litigants would
achieve even greater rates of success in court. They would exert even
greater influence on judicial agendas and substantive law, and they would
“play for the rules” even more so than they already do.64 The interactions
that link the two hemispheres together would therefore have the ironic
effect of pushing them even further apart.
2. Relaxing Regulation in the Corporate Hemisphere
In the corporate hemisphere, mechanisms of professional regulation
combat the hemispheres’ structural inequities in a different but equally
important way—by bolstering professional independence from clients. The
profession’s codes of conduct do so by requiring lawyers to balance duties
to clients with baseline duties to opponents, third parties, courts, and the
general public. They prohibit a lawyer from engaging in certain conduct
that corporate management might otherwise direct, such as interviewing
corporate constituents without sufficient disclosures65 and communicating
directly with employees and third parties who are represented by separate
counsel.66 They impose affirmative duties on a lawyer to report corporate
wrongdoing up the ladder to the board of directors.67 These and other rules
also stand as important justifications for lawyers to exercise their
independent judgment in serving clients’ interests in ways that comport
with the fairness and equity of the legal system—not only (or necessarily)
because they want to, but also because they may otherwise lose their
license.
Without the protections of professional regulation in the corporate
hemisphere, the dangers of insufficient professional independence, long
noted by scholars,68 would be fully realized. There would be little to stop
sophisticated corporate actors from co-opting lawyers into facilitating
excessively aggressive or unethical business schemes.69 At least some
lawyers would engage in legal strategies and tactics that, while highly
64. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 10 (2013) (requiring clarification
that the lawyer represents the corporation and that the constituent may seek independent
counsel).
66. Id. R. 4.2 (requiring a lawyer to communicate only with the lawyer of a represented
individual).
67. Corporate counsel has a duty under section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 to report corporate misconduct and wrongdoing
“up the ladder” and eventually to the board of directors. Roger C. Cramton, George M.
Cohen & Susan P. Kroniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49
VILL. L. REV. 725, 739–41 (2004).
68. See, e.g., Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving
Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 253 (2001); Robert Eli
Rosen, Problem-Setting and Serving the Organizational Client: Legal Diagnosis and
Professional Independence, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 179, 184 (2001).
69. Dana Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First Century Legal Profession, 63
DUKE L.J. 1243, 1263–73 (2014).
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beneficial to their clients, would be harmful to society at large. For
example, they might advise clients on ways of circumventing safety or
environmental regulations that follow the text but not the spirit of the law,
or recommend questionable tax strategies that would likely avoid
detection.70 Even worse, some lawyers might enable illegal and destructive
behavior, as lawyers did in recent corporate scandals, such as Enron and
KPMG.71
These examples highlight that it is not only in litigation practice, but also
in counseling and transactional work, that the lawyers of one hemisphere
can have significant and often harmful influence on the clients of the other.
When corporate lawyers insert binding arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts, it is individuals of the personal-services hemisphere who are
excluded from court. When corporate lawyers help their clients evade tax
liability, it is the public fisc that suffers. And as one corporate scandal after
another has shown,72 when corporate lawyers facilitate their clients’
excessively risky profit-maximizing strategies, it is the public at large that
pays the price.73 The protections of professional regulation are critical in
these and countless other situations, not to protect clients from their
lawyers, but to protect third parties, the public, and lawyers themselves
from problematic ways in which savvy corporate clients can use their
lawyers.
A loosening of professional regulation in either of the profession’s
hemispheres would therefore threaten harm to the integrity of the legal
system as a whole. In the corporate hemisphere, it would allow savvy
clients to manipulate their lawyers to unfair, unethical, or even illegal ends.
In the personal-services hemisphere, it would depress the quality of legal
services and perversely entrench existing and deep-seated inequities in the
profession and in society at large.
We cannot, and perhaps should not, control fully for some disparities,
such as the amount of resources individuals and entities have or choose to
spend on legal matters.74 But we can ensure a base level of competence,
70. Barton, supra note 31, at 474.
71. Remus, supra note 69, at 1243, 1273.
72. See Alexi Barrionuevo, Two Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A1; Corporate America’s Woes, Continued,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 2002, at 59; Andrew Ross Sorkin & Alex Berenson, Tyco Admits
Using Accounting Tactics To Inflate Earnings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, at A1; Ken
Belson, Adelphia Proposes To Settle Federal Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2004),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07E5D81639F93AA15751C1A9629C8B
63; Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses, Inflating Cash Flow
$3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/26/business/
worldcom-says-it-hid-expenses-inflating-cash-flow-3.8-billion.html.
73. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1154–
55 (2005) (describing the role of in-house and outside counsel in the Enron scandal); Zach
Lowe, Lawyer To Serve Six-and-a-Half Years in KPMG Tax Fraud Case, AM. L. DAILY
(Apr. 2, 2009, 11:30 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/04/kpmglawyer.html.
74. Rhode, supra note 30, at 373 (“Although there is broad agreement that the quality of
justice should not depend on the ability to pay, there is little corresponding consensus on an
alternative. How do we deal with disparities in incentives, resources, and legal ability? True
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conduct, and independence among all lawyers. That our current system of
professional regulation is not doing an adequate job is reason not to
abandon it, but to improve it. In the next and final Part, I offer preliminary
thoughts on how we might do so.
III. THE PATH AHEAD
To be effective, professional regulation must account not only for the
differences and distance between the profession’s two hemispheres, but also
for the interactions that link them together. As discussed, these interactions
are frequently characterized by significant power and wealth disparities that
skew the playing field in and out of court. In this Part, I propose that the
profession address these imbalances by moving beyond existing reform
proposals and thinking creatively about new ways to target the principal
problems of each hemisphere—the need for increased access and
competency in the personal-services hemisphere and increased
independence in the corporate hemisphere. After outlining the broad
contours of reform, I briefly note a few proposals deserving of extended
study.
In the personal-services hemisphere, the principal challenge is not just
access, but access to competent services. Reform efforts should therefore
aim to draw a greater number of qualified and competent lawyers into
practice settings and areas that serve individuals. Given that the principal
deterrent is low incomes, a central goal should be increasing funds to
support legal aid and public-interest organizations. This could be
accomplished through a new tax on law firm profits or through a new
requirement that all licensed lawyers pay an annual sum to fund lowincome lawyering. Given the number of licensed lawyers in the country, a
requirement of even a single average billable hour could raise significant
funds (if implemented in all states). Highly competent lawyers could also
be drawn into the lower-income practice areas of the personal-services
hemisphere through improved and expanded loan repayment programs.75
In the corporate hemisphere, the principal challenge is to bolster lawyers’
independence from their clients. Reform efforts should therefore aim to
equality in legal assistance would presumably require not only massive public expenditures
but also the restriction of private expenditures.”).
75. Expanded loan repayment programs could incentivize entry into the lower income
practice areas of the personal-services hemisphere. Currently, the federal government and
twenty-four states have variations of these programs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee (2012)
(codifying provisions for the Federal Perkins Loan, which includes a public-service
loan forgiveness provision); State Loan Repayment Assistance Programs, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/loan_repayme
nt_assistance_programs/state_loan_repayment_assistance_programs.html (last visited Apr.
26, 2014). But many offer very limited repayment. Recently, the ABA concluded that
although the number of these programs has begun to increase, most of them “still do not
meet most of the need of many attorneys who would like to work in the public interest.”
Loan Repayment Assistance Programs, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_
aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/loan_repayment_assistance_programs.html (last updated
Sept. 21, 2012). States that do not have these programs should establish them, and existing
programs should be expanded and publicized to gain additional support.
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protect third parties, the public, and lawyers themselves from the ways in
which clients can manipulate and use lawyers to facilitate problematic ends.
New conduct rules could, for example, impose heightened reporting
requirements and corresponding exceptions to the confidentiality rules.
A more drastic set of reforms targeted at heightened professional
independence would acknowledge and account for the different pressures
lawyers feel in different work settings. The independence of in-house
counsel, for example, is inherently undermined by the reality that the client
is also the employer.76 One way to account for this would be to impose
different obligations and protections on lawyers who employ themselves as
opposed to those who are employed by their client.77
The goals of increased competency and access in the personal-services
hemisphere and increased independence in the corporate hemisphere
interrelate in important ways. Competent lawyers serving individuals can
police the independence of corporate lawyers by challenging and
uncovering corporate wrongdoing that implicates or co-opts lawyers’
services. Successful class-action attorneys can be particularly effective in
this regard.78 Independent corporate lawyers, for their part, can ameliorate
the need for this type of policing by counseling corporate clients to follow
the spirit as well as the letter of the law.
Independent corporate lawyers can also bolster access to competent
services in the personal-services hemisphere by increasing both awareness
and supply. By complying with their duties to advise corporate constituents
to secure separate counsel79 and by refraining from giving an impression of
disinterestedness to unrepresented parties,80 corporate lawyers can help
individuals recognize when they have a legal issue with which a lawyer
could help. Moreover, independent corporate lawyers are more likely to
recognize and honor their duties to the state and society as well as to private
clients—duties that require heightened efforts to represent underserved
populations through pro bono and public interest work. When corporate
lawyers comply with these duties by offering pro bono services to

76. In-house lawyers may become so involved in management’s decisionmaking and so
enmeshed in the corporate culture that their perspective becomes entirely aligned with
corporate management, precluding the possibility of independent judgment. Deborah A.
DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 967–69 (2005).
77. A useful though inexact analogy is England’s bifurcated structure of barristers and
solicitors. One of the primary justifications for that structure is that barristers, who have
minimal contact with their clients (since everything proceeds through the solicitor) can offer
a more independent opinion, free from direct pressures from a client. Judith L. Maute,
Revolutionary Changes to the English Legal Profession or Much Ado About Nothing?, 17
PROF. LAW., no. 4, 2006, at 1, 4.
78. See Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 1385, 1416 (2011) (“[C]lass action rules were designed, in part, to ensure that
individuals who enforce the law as ‘private attorneys general’ do so in the public interest.”).
79. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2013) (requiring clarification that the
lawyer represents the corporation and that the constituent should seek independent counsel).
80. Id. R. 4.3 (requiring a lawyer to refrain from giving an impression of
disinterestedness when interacting with an unrepresented party).
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individuals, they take important steps in addressing the insufficient supply
of lawyers in the personal-services hemisphere.
No single reform or strategy will provide a quick fix for the pernicious
effects of the profession’s structural imbalances. But by pursuing multiple
strategies at once with the goals of increasing access, competency, and
professional independence, the profession can decrease wealth and power
disparities between the lawyers and clients of the two hemispheres and
work towards a more level playing field in and out of court.
CONCLUSION
Legal scholars have long sought to account for the structure of the legal
profession in their regulatory proposals. They have generally done so by
accepting the existence of the profession’s two hemispheres and by treating
each as a domain unto itself. I have argued that effective ethical regulation
must account for the profession’s structure in a much broader way—by
seeking to understand the system-wide implications of its bifurcated
structure. Understanding these implications, in turn, requires attention not
just to the distance and differentiation between the profession’s
hemispheres but to the client connections that bind them together.
Tending to these connections reveals a critical way in which the stratified
lawyers of the profession’s hemispheres participate in reproducing the
power disparities that they reflect. It also reveals that successful efforts to
address inequitable access to legal services will have to address disparities
between the profession’s hemispheres. A critical starting point will be to
increase competency and access in the personal-services hemisphere and
independence in the corporate hemisphere.

